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• Financial services in developing countries are often 
expensive, leaving many of the poorest citizens without 
access to bank accounts. However, the growth of mobile 
payment services have been seen as a way to increase 
access by allowing individuals to send and receive 
payments through their phones. 
• Although there has been much research on the benefits 
of ‘mobile money’, there has been relatively little 
academic inquiry into the firms who provide such 
services and their effectiveness.
• This research comprised of two country level surveys 
of the retail agents involved in selling mobile payment 
systems in Bangladesh and Tanzania. Its aim was to 
understand their relationship with the distributors or 
master agents for whom they sell the service for.  
• The findings of the research suggest that the 
performance of retail agents in Bangladesh and 
Tanzania are strongly affected by the relationship 
they form with their distributors or master agents, 
particularly in terms of communication, training, and 
goals.
• The researchers conclude that in order to improve the 
performance of retail payment agents, it is important to 
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Mobile payment in developing countries
Access to banking services is often expensive in developing economies, and 
this restricts the ability of consumers and employers to reduce financial 
costs and risks. Moreover, banks in developing countries have tended to 
avoid the low returns and high risks involved in serving the segment of 
the market living in poverty. Thus, the lack of financial provision impacts 
disproportionately on the poor (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). For the 
unbanked, the alternative payment mechanism is cash, but it is costly to 
store and expensive and dangerous to transport. Hence large segments 
of population in developing economies use costly (and risky) informal 
financial mechanisms, such as money lenders or hand-delivered cash 
transfers. 
Recently, information and communication technology has developed 
in such a way that some of these longstanding market failures in the 
provision of financial services in developing countries may begin to be 
addressed. By developing transaction and loan products that can be 
accessed directly through mobile phones (e.g., MShwari loan products in 
Kenya), mobile payment systems (MPS) may alleviate the constraints on 
the market of banking services provision. Mobile payment services may 
also foster financial inclusion in developing countries by providing a cheap 
and secure way of transferring, and in certain cases, storing money
Despite the considerable potential of this innovation for economic growth, 
relatively limited research has been undertaken on the firms that provide 
mobile payment services in countries where the poorest members of 
society are largely excluded from financial services1. To do so requires the 
collection of primary data at the firm level, which we undertook via two 
country level surveys of the agents involved in the provision of MPS. We 
conducted our research in Bangladesh and Tanzania, each representing 
a different case of mobile payment diffusion. Bangladesh has facilitated 
a bank-led approach to MPS while Tanzania, one of the world’s fastest 
growing mobile markets with 31.8 million accounts, has followed a 
telecom-led approach like its neighbour Kenya.    
Through this research, we are interested in understanding how different 
ways of configuring the supply side of the provision of MPS may affect the 
expansion and performance of the mobile payment providers. We use our 
dataset to explore the relationship between firm capabilities and the spread 
of MPS service, as well as the relationship between the organisational 
architecture of firms and their performance.
Our findings suggest that the performance of retail mobile agents in 
1. Important research however has been undertaken on the impact of the introduction of MPS on 
consumers and on the financial behaviour of the poor (Jack and Suri (2011, 2014); Mbiti and Weil 
(2011)).  
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Bangladesh and Tanzania is strongly affected by the relationship that 
they form with their distributors or master agents.  Specifically, goal 
congruence, bidirectional flows of information, and quality and quantity 
of meetings and training affect all aspects of retail agent performance. 
These effects on performance are supported by the quality of retail 
agent’s human capital, motivation, and choices that retail agents make to 
specialise their business. 
The policy implications of our work resonate with the concerns of 
practitioners and policymakers about the role of retail agents in the mobile 
money ecosystem. Even with advances in peer-to-peer mobile payment 
technologies, retail agents continue to be the backbone of  mobile money 
infrastructure.  The selection, engagement, and performance of retail 
agents affect diffusion of mobile payments networks and their effectiveness 
in bridging the gaps in access to financial services2. Our research clearly 
shows that in order to improve the performance of retail payment agents, 
it is important to select agents carefully and train them well. A further 
significant factor in company success is the establishment of a relationship 
of trust and open communication between retail agents and the mobile 
payment operators and their surrogates.  
What are the key factors determining the 
performance of mobile payment agents? 
Our survey is designed to delve deeply into the organisational 
arrangements within the suppliers, with additional heterogeneity being 
provided across countries and form of provider (banks versus telecom 
companies).  The decision to provide MPS may require new resources 
and capabilities for both banks and telecom companies. Banks operating 
in this market may need to target a type of consumer that they do not 
traditionally serve, while telecom companies (telcos) lack experience in 
the banking business model of intermediation. We centre attention in 
our work on the intermediary for both types of provider in the supply of 
MPS; the distributor or master agent and their relationship with the actual 
supplier, the agent. Retail agents are typically shop or stall owners, selling 
a variety of mobile payment services directly to the customer, typically as 
only one element of their business, while the MPS provider, be it a bank 
or a telco, contracts only with the master agent (see the organisational 
structure in the Appendix).
Central to the business model but unlike either banking or mobile network 
operators (MNOs), mobile payment providers use an intermediary, called 
a distributor or master agent, to help the retail agents with their liquidity 
management (rebalancing cash and e-float). Managing and expanding 
the agent network is critical for the successful performance and growth 
2. GSMA (2015). State of the Industry Report: Mobile Money.
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of the mobile payment system. Retail agents (henceforth agents) are the 
customer facing side of the company, conducting all the cash-in and cash-
out operations. From the perspective of the company, if there are too many 
agents, some of them will be unable to generate enough business to cover 
the cost of liquidity management. On the other hand, if there are too few 
agents, customers may not be served adequately and business growth may 
be limited. 
Context: Bangladesh and Tanzania
Both Bangladesh and Tanzania have relatively established mobile 
payment systems. The first product was launched in 2006 in Bangladesh 
(MobiCash/Grameenphone) and in 2008 in Tanzania with M-Pesa 
(Vodacom).  These countries have been chosen because they represent 
different organisational orientations of the provision of mobile payment 
services. Bangladesh, following the Central Bank’s “Guidelines on Mobile 
Financial Services (MFS) for the Banks” (September 2011), has favoured 
a bank-led approach to mobile money through partnership models led by 
banks with organisations such as BRAC and DBBL. Tanzania has instead 
followed a telecom-led approach driven by telecom companies such as 
Tigo, Airtel, and Vodacom.
Data collection
We collected information on 700 retail agents in Bangladesh from March-
April 2016 in four different administrative divisions (Dhaka, Rajshahi, 
Barisal, and Chittagong) covering different rural and urban areas. We 
conducted the data collection in Tanzania from May-June 2016. In total, 
we obtained a sample of 400 interviews, in three different locations: Dar es 
Salaam, Morogoro, and the coastal region (Pwani).
In Bangladesh, we see from Figure 1 that 57% of the agents were located 
in Dhaka, and the rest were split evenly between the districts of Barisal, 
Chittagong, and Rajshahi. We found that 92% of the retail agents were 
located in an urban area, 94% of them were stationed in a fixed spot (in 
opposition to mobile), and only one agent was female (see Table 1). 
In Tanzania, Figure 2 reveals that 50% of the retail agents in the sample 
were located in Dar es Salaam, the capital city, while the rest were divided 
evenly between Morogoro and the coastal area. We found that 84% of the 
agents were located in an urban area, 99% of them were stationed in a 
fixed spot (in opposition to mobile), and 55% were male (Table 1).
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Figure 1: Geographic coverage - Bangladesh
Figure 2: Geographic coverage - Tanzania
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Table 1 – Summary statistics 
3. 7 “Everyday”, 6 “2 to 3 times per week”, 5 “4 to 6 times per week”, 4 “Once per week”, 3 “Between 
once per week and once every two weeks”, 2 “Between once every two weeks and once per month”, 1 
“Less than once a month”.
4. From 1 “A very small part of total revenues” to 5 “A very large part of total revenues”.
5. From 1 “Very Low competition” to 5 “Very high competition”.
6. From 1 “Very low risk” to 5 “Very high risk”.
  Whole sample   Bangladesh   Tanzania  
Means 
difference
  Obs Mean   Obs Mean   Obs Mean  
Bangladesh-
Tanzania
    Variable t-stat
Frequency meeting distributor1 1077 5.22 700 6.22 377 3.36 -32.46 ***
Satisfied relation with distributor 1084 0.77 693 0.78 391 0.74 -1.48
Nb of training received 1100 1.48 700 1.27 400 1.85 6.38 ***
Adequate training 973 0.94 646 0.96 327 0.89 -4.35 ***
Male 1100 0.83 700 1 400 0.55 -23.96 ***
Owner dummy 1100 0.7 700 0.86 400 0.42 -17.38 ***
Age 1098 29.9 699 31.29 399 27.47 -8.39 ***
Level of education 1057 2.47 658 2.71 399 2.07 -8.94 ***
# providers served 1100 2.41 700 2.24 400 2.7 6.68 ***
MPS revenues, share of total2 1080 2.83 687 2.29 393 3.77 16.54 ***
Stationed 1100 0.96 700 0.94 400 0.99 3.92 ***
Nb of employees 1100 1.67 700 1.84 400 1.36 -8.33 ***
Intensity of competition3 1100 3.53 700 3.54 400 3.51 -0.59
Security is an issue 1100 0.29 700 0.2 400 0.45 9.06 ***
Perception security risk4 1100 3.28 700 3.32 400 3.22 -1.81
Time nearest provider (min) 1100 6.2 700 4.12 400 9.85 4.74 ***
Travel time to get cash (min) 1086 34.56 700 6.79 386 84.92 16.71 ***
Nb of transaction denied/week 1090 10.41 697 8.39 393 13.99 3.51 ***
Age mobile money business 1063 4.9 695 5.07 368 4.59 -4.4 ***
Days open/week 1100 6.56 700 6.59 400 6.51 -2.27 **
Hours open/day 1099 6.15   700 6.13   399 6.19   0.97  
Agent’s motivation for starting their Mobile Payment Agency business
 
To increase my business 768 0.89 602 0.89 166 0.88 -0.27
My clients asked for it 768 0.34 602 0.42 166 0.05 -9.53 ***
Chosen by the provider 768 0.01 602 0 166 0.02 2.1 **
Chosen by the distributor 768 0.03   602 0.03   166 0.02   -0.29  
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The agents’ business characteristics
In Bangladesh, Bkash clearly dominates the market with 91% of the agents 
offering its services, followed by DBBL (66%), Mcash (19%), Mycash 
(15%), and Ucash (22%). As Table 1 makes clear, agents usually serve 
more than one provider; indeed, they serve two providers on average, with 
a maximum of nine. There are fewer providers in Tanzania. There are 
three key players, each served by almost all the retail agents. Indeed, 93% 
of the agents offer Vodacom MPS, 76% of them offer Airtel services, and 
96% Tigo services. We note that Zantel is very marginal, with only 3% 
of the agents interviewed offering its mobile payment service. On average, 
agents in Bangladesh serve more providers than those in Tanzania. Thus, 
the average is that each agent serves three providers (Tigo, Vodacom, and 
Airtel), with a maximum of five.
We find that retail agents are predominantly young (under 30 years old), 
male, and moderately educated. Around 70% have their own business, 
which are usually small (less than two employees), and the vast majority 
are stationed rather than mobile in their location. Their mobile business 
is typically very young, less than five years old, and the agents work very 
hard – they are on average open 6.6 days per week, six hours per day. 
These agents usually serve more than two providers, and the MPS activity 
on average represents only a moderate share of their revenue. The sector is 
highly competitive, with agents perceiving high levels of local competition 
in the supply of MPS services. Perceptions of risk are also typically rather 
high though only a minority have faced a security issue. Turning to the 
relationship with the master agent/distributor, most retail agents meet 
their distributor relatively frequently and are relatively satisfied with their 
relationship. Most have received some, but not much training, but the vast 
majority consider this to be adequate nonetheless. 
There are relatively important differences between Bangladesh and 
Tanzania in terms of the characteristics of the retail agents, their 
relationship with the master agents, the business model, and the external 
context of activity (see Figure 2). Interestingly, there are no significant 
differences between samples in terms of agents’ satisfaction with their 
master agent and their perception of the competition and of the security 
risk to their business.
Agents in Tanzania meet their master agent less frequently, while serving 
more MPS providers than those in Bangladesh. This may reflect differences 
resulting from the bank as against telco-based MPS system in each 
country.  MPS also represent a higher share of retail agents’ revenues 
in Tanzania than in Bangladesh, though firms have fewer employees on 
average. It is important to note that 86% of the agents in total reported 
having another business alongside the MPS activity (95% in Bangladesh 
and 71% in Tanzania). Generally, this other line of activity is a grocery 
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store, airtime distribution, stationary shop, or other type of shop (beauty 
salon, clothing, cosmetics, laundry, etc.). This may indicate that the 
business model of agents in Bangladesh is much more geared towards 
diversification of revenues than in Tanzania. However, interviewed agents 
are also much more likely to be the owners of their shop in Bangladesh, 
while in Tanzania it is more often an employee (86% were owners in 
Bangladesh, against 42% in Tanzania). This might suggest two distinct 
diversification models: on the one hand, a mobile payment activity 
added to an existing shop in Bangladesh (for instance operating a mobile 
payment desk inside a grocery shop premises), and on the other hand, a 
diversification of revenues via the operation of various activities located 
in different premises, operated by employees and periodically visited by a 
monitoring owner.
Figure 3: Business characteristics
The characteristics of the agents vary also significantly between the 
countries (see Figure 3). First of all, as mentioned before, agents are 
almost exclusively male in Bangladesh while it is much more balanced 
in Tanzania, with 45% of agents being female. Retail agents are also 
significantly younger and less educated in Tanzania than in Bangladesh, 
but this might be related to the fact that the interviewed agents tended to 
be the employees in Tanzania, while they most frequently were the owner 
of the shop in Bangladesh.
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Figure 4: Characteristics of the agents and their business
Agents were also asked their motivation for starting their mobile payment 
agency business (see Figure 4). The number of observations for this 
question is reduced due to the fact that this it is only applicable to owners, 
and therefore was not asked to interviewees who were employees. Agents 
could choose more than one reason. As noted above, the vast majority said 
that they did so in order to increase their business, reflecting the fact that 
the MPS activity is generally not the only business operated by the agent. 
While very few agents declared that they were chosen by the provider or 
by the distributor in both countries (around 2%-3%), 42% of the agents 
in Bangladesh also said that one of the reasons they decided to launch 
this activity was that their clients asked for it, while only 5% said so in 
Tanzania. This suggests a much more demand-driven approach to mobile 
payment in Bangladesh.
Figure 5: Motivations for starting MPS
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Configuring organisational capabilities for MPS
Our model and empirical methodology
We have collected survey data on 1,100 agents located in Bangladesh and 
in Tanzania. There is only one wave so the data represent a cross-agent, 
cross-country dataset. We use our dataset to explore the relationship 
between firm capabilities and the diffusion of MPS service, as well as 
between firms’ organisational architecture and performance. In particular, 
we wish to understand the factors determining the performance of mobile 
payment agents. In the architecture of MPS delivery, the organisational 
structure is highly decentralised, so we are exploring the factors which 
facilitate such arrangements delivering good performance at the agent 
level. We analyse success both in terms of volume of transactions and the 
rate of expansion of the business (new clients). We focus on three principal 
areas, each of which are linked to one or more of the five factors outlined 
above, namely:  
• the support that they receive from their distributor; 
• the level of agent’s human capital; and 
• the business model that they have adopted (for instance, whether the 
mobile payment activity is their main activity, or if it is only an added 
resource channel).
Findings
We found that retail agents’ performance in terms of business volumes 
and growth were enhanced by three key aspects of the relationship with 
the master agents (and behind that the MPS provider). In particular, in a 
decentralised organisational structure such as MPS provision, the benefits 
of goal congruence and mutual information flows between the master and 
retail agent, indicated by the frequency of meetings and the quantity of 
training provided, is found to be positively associated with all aspects of 
performance.  The quality of human capital of the agent, captured by his/
her level of education, has some positive significant effects on transactions 
but does not significantly affect business expansion. Thirdly, the 
specialisation of the retail agent’s business, indicated by the share of MPS 
in total revenue, was found to improve the efficiency of decentralisation 
as an organisational structure and be positively related to performance. 
Finally, we also identify strong positive effects on performance from agent 
motivations, in particular when the motivation to offer the service is 
related to a desire to increase the agent’s business.
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Policy implications
Our study has important implications both for policymakers and for 
business people in the MPS sector. There is some evidence from our study 
that MPS may address some of the issues for the process of economic 
development caused by deficiencies in the institutional environment. Thus, 
security risks in a location increase the demand for mobile money, and 
more permanent and longer established businesses provide a sounder basis 
for expansion of the sector. For MPS providers, the key lessons concern 
information exchange and trust. The development of the MPS business 
at the retail agent level is driven partly by agents’ motivation, but also by 
the architecture into which the agent is placed. There is a payoff in terms 
of performance from frequent meetings with the master agent, as well as 
via the provision of quality training.  Careful screening of retail agents to 
ensure that educational standards are met and that MPS is an important 
element of the agents’ business model can also help to improve business 
performance in this growing and significant sector.
References
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Banerjee, Abhijit V, & Duflo, Esther. (2011). Poor 
economics: A radical rethinking of  the way to fight global poverty. New 
York: Public Affairs.
Pelletier, A. Khavul, S. and Estrin, S. (2017) Mobile payment services in 
developing countries: firm capabilities and financial development, IGC 
Discussion Paper
Jack, W. and Suri, T., 2014. Risk sharing and transactions costs: 
Evidence from Kenya’s mobile money revolution.  American Economic 
Review, 104(1), pp.183-223.
Mbiti, I., & Weil, D. N. 2013. The Home Economics of E-Money: Velocity, 
Cash Management, and Discount Rates of M-Pesa Users. American 
Economic Review, 103(3): 369-374.
Appendix
Organisational structure – the example of Vodacom in Tanzania
Vodacom operates a two-tier structure with individual stores (subagents, 
in Vodacom’s parlance) depending on master agents (or agent Head Offices 
(HOs)). Agent HOs maintain contact with Vodacom and perform two key 
functions: liquidity management and distributing agent commissions. Indi-
vidual stores may be directly owned by an agent HO or may be working for 
one under contract. In the latter case, Vodacom does not prescribe the terms 
of agent HO store contracts, so they are free to work out their own liquidity 
management arrangements and split of agent commissions. Stores are free 
to switch between agent HOs. This also allowed Vodacom to use informal 
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‘mom-and-pop’ stores as sub-agents, while Vodacom’s contract was with 
the HO.
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